How States Think: The Rationality of Foreign Policy
The legendary foreign policy expert John Mearshiemer has partnered up with the University of Notre Dame’s Sebastian Rosato to write a short, thought provoking but slightly clanky book around a simple but essential theme; a counterpunch to what the authors describe as the “common claim that rationality is rare in world politics.” They make the argument that we shouldn’t judge foreign policy on its outcomes, which may be disastrous and therefore viewed as irrational, but instead by the process by which it came to be. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is seen as more rational than the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.
You can’t doubt that the authors are rational. The book was almost three years in the making and has been peer reviewed and subjected to all manner of interrogation. That is made clear on purpose as a central tenant of what makes rational policy is a combination of credible theory—such as casual logic or nuclear war game theory—with robust and uninhibited deliberative policy making processes.
Non-credible theories—such as domino theory, democracy promotion or anything based purely on emotion—cannot be buttressed by deliberative decision making, nor can credible theory without the decision-making process that follows be described as “rational.” Such a process is continuous and comfortable with changing from previous conclusions in a manner distinct from ideology although that is not specifically investigated.
Concluding that most foreign policy is rational of course defends the purpose of the subject as a discipline, although the authors admit to the perennial issue of partial information that defines all of history’s decision making. Yet as clear as the authors central argument is they caveat it by reminder readers that it is “ultimately an empirical question” with “limited evidence” as to the answer.
A short history of what preceded the era of irrationality, which they seek to challenge, speaks to old ideas of utility maximization—described as “a defective approach for making decisions” due to data scarcity and political psychology that is described as far too reliant on analogies and “mental shortcuts that are based on the observations of historical events.”
The book unpacks high-profile cases of strategic and crisis foreign policy decisions that have been in their view incorrectly viewed as irrational. From Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis to the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor a brief analysis of the credible theories and deliberative decision making is given. Despite rational thinking being “ubiquitous,” the book also looks at non-rational examples such as the brief period before World War II when the United Kingdom decided to accept no liability if Germany invaded France, or the German decision ahead of World War I to seek a balance of naval forces with the United Kingdom.
It's a short read but lands its key argument well despite a slightly garbled introduction and a tendency toward repetition over concise language. This sometimes makes you feel as if they’re trying to convince themselves as to their argument, indeed if you’re not left knowing how states think at the end of the book, you certainly know what the authors do and how they got there.