The Second Manassas Campaign (Military Campaigns of the Civil War)

“This well-chosen and written series of essays brings new light to this often overlooked campaign and shows that this was not a side-show of the Eastern Theater, but a critical battle in its own right . . .”

The Second Manassas Campaign is one of the least chronicled campaigns of the Eastern Theater of the Civil War. Coming between the critical Seven Days Battles and the Battle of Antietam, it is often relegated to a less important place of that critical summer of 1862. But as this new collection of essays demonstrates, this campaign is more critical to the eventual outcome of the war than previously considered.

The essays cover a variety of topics from grand strategy, to logistics, to the highly politicized aspect of the battle, particularly the considerable infighting of the Lincoln Administration and the Union officer corps that severely impacted the Union’s ability to wage war during this critical year. A few of the essays really stand out for covering topics that are very underserved or extremely enlightening for the future conduct of the war in the Eastern Theater.

The essay covering the logistics of the Union Army of Virginia continues to prove the maxim that “amateurs talk tactics while professionals talk logistics.” This army, formed from the remains of the Union forces badly handled during Stonewall Jackson’s Valley Campaign, suffered considerable hardship, nearly running out of food and fodder despite the logistical largess of the Union Army. Mismanagement and political infighting prevented critical supplies reaching the newly formed Army just as the campaign began and these logistical issues continued to degrade the Union forces throughout the summer. Readers used to assuming the overwhelming Union material advantage during the war may be surprised to learn just how poorly logistics were at this point in the war as both armies were learning how to use railroads and telegraphs to coordinate the movement of food, ammunition, and fodder for thousands of men and horses in the field.

The essay examining the formation of Confederate strategy at this time brings a new perspective as the author delves into the strategic options open to General Robert E. Lee in the wake of the successful defense of Richmond. This author examines the formation of Lee’s “grand strategy” of offensive action in light of his experience not during the Seven Days, but during the fall and winter of 1861–1862 when he headed the Confederate Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida.

Here Lee was first exposed to the mobility of the Union Navy and their ability to transport, land, and control virtually any part of the Confederate coast. Lee’s thinking was influenced by this operational reality to believe that a static defensive strategy would not succeed in obtaining Southern independence. The author makes a convincing case that Lee’s offensive mindset, clearly on display during the Second Manassas Campaign, was that only a decisive victory over Union Armies in the field would convince the populace and presumably the Lincoln Administration to give up the fight. Interestingly, the author notes that Lee was much more pessimistic than other Confederate leaders about the potential for foreign intervention of behalf of the Confederacy and believed the South would have to win their independence on their own, another potential factor in his developing aggressive spirit.

Finally, the two essays on the highly politicized nature of this campaign show not only the constant relationship between war and politics, as Clausewitz wrote about, but the particular issue of the Civil War—the emancipation of the slaves and the end of slavery.

Two essays cover the encounter of soldiers with slaves during the campaign and the politicization of the Union officer corps as Radical Republicans in Congress and the Lincoln Administration seek to begin essentially a purge of the conservative general officers affiliated with the Democratic Party in favor of generals like John Pope, a true Republican among the officer corps willing to take a harder stance against slavery. The political intrigue surrounding Pope’s appointment to command this new army, jumping over several generals more senior to him, was definitely a contributing factor in the Union defeat. The infighting among the Union generals, particularly General George McClellan’s intentional tardiness in coming to Pope’s support does not reflect well on Abraham Lincoln’s role as commander-in-chief during this time.

This infighting culminates in the court-martial of General Fitz John Porter, covered in an essay that clearly shows the complete miscarriage of justice for this officer, motivated by not only John Pope’s desire to deflect blame of the decisive defeat suffered at the hands of Lee’s Army, but Abraham Lincoln’s desire to deflect responsibility for appointing Pope commander in the first place. To call this a kangaroo court with a predetermined outcome is a serious understatement and the author describes the complete corruption of the entire process, which resulted in Porter’s dismissal from the Army and the beginning of his almost 25-year fight to clear his name, which he finally succeeds in completing before his death.

This well-chosen and written series of essays brings new light to this often overlooked campaign and shows that this was not a side-show of the Eastern Theater, but a critical battle in its own right that had significant strategic and operational influence on the conduct of the war during the critical period from June 1862 until the Battle of Gettysburg in July 1863.